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Thinking Territory Historically 
 
It is somewhat ironic, given the paucity of conceptual work on territory, that one of the key pieces that does 
theorise the term should so often be seen as warning us away from it.
1
 It should, of course, go without 
saying that territory itself is not a trap. Rather, it is certain ways of thinking about territory, particularly 
those largely uncritical assumptions of International Relations and International Political Economy, that is 
the problem. Those assumptions, which Agnew skilfully unpicked, actually require more, not less, work on 
territory. We need to investigate not simply the implications of thinking within this trap—how it constrains 
our thinking, and hamstrings our potential for critique—but how it is produced. What we do when we 
accept the territorial trap is to buy-into a state-centred narrative that naturalises and normalises this way of 
thinking.
2
 
 
What do we mean when we talk of territory? There seem to be two dominant definitions in the literature. 
One sees a territory as a bounded space, a container, under the control of a group of people, nowadays 
usually a state. The other sees a territory as an outcome of territoriality, a human behaviour or strategy. 
These two definitions are, of course, not mutually exclusive.
3
 Both are mentioned, en passant, in Agnew‘s 
article. Yet neither definition really addresses the kinds of questions that Agnew is asking us to consider. 
How did boundaries get drawn? Why should the space that they enclose be thought of as exclusive and 
limited? Why are boundaries seen as dividing one polity from another, and therefore domestic from foreign 
politics? Why do certain groups claim a monopoly of power within those lines, and how do they continue 
to hold this, and then later receive a legal basis for those claims? Why do those that wish to challenge this 
situation—self-determination movements, for instance—not want a different system but their own stake 
within it? Why, today, are boundaries largely seen as fixed? In the argument being made here, territory 
must be conceived as an historically and geographically specific form of political organization and political 
thought. It simply cannot be taken for granted, nor approached through the notion of territoriality, which 
lacks the historical and geographical specificity of territory, both as a practice and a form. 
 
In a piece published the year after ‗The Territorial Trap‘, but much less well-known, Agnew provided an 
interesting gloss on this argument.
4
 He was critical of two key assumptions that shaped debates in the mid 
1990s: the idea that social science had neglected space; and that there was a ‗geographical turn‘ taking 
place. Rather than being ‗spaceless‘, he suggested, social science had long been filled with geographical 
terms and assumptions. One of these, of course, was the territorial trap. But, he argued, the reason that this 
thinking had become static and unable to cope with dynamics, change and transition was that ―social 
science has been too geographical and not sufficiently historical, in the sense that geographical assumptions 
have trapped consideration of social and political-economic processes in geographical structures and 
containers that defy historical change‖.5 
 
One way out of the territorial trap, then, is a historical investigation of how it came about. Agnew makes 
the importance of this clear in the piece, but it has tended to be underplayed in those analyses that have 
come in its wake.
6
 While such a historical investigation could be done by tracing the ways that IR and IPE 
scholars have assumed things about, rather than thought about, territory, the way I am trying to pursue it is 
to trace the emergence of the term within Western political thought. This is generally done within the early 
modern period—Hobbes, Locke, Westphalia, etc.—that is seen as the time of the birth of territorial states 
and the international system. As I have argued elsewhere, at this time, the linkage between territory and 
sovereignty can be found most clearly articulated in the work of Leibniz.
7
 But it is important to realise that 
the particular histories of specific territorial states postdates the articulation of the idea, which was worked 
through in inchoate form some time earlier. 
 
Although the word ‗territory‘ regularly appears in translations of Thucydides, Aristotle, Caesar and Tacitus, 
the Greek khora (in its unstressed sense of land, rather than the philosophical sense it has in Plato‘s 
Timaeus) or the Latin terra invoke a rather different set of possibilities. For those relatively rare 
invocations in classical Latin of the term territorium, in Cicero, for instance, this was the land belonging to 
a town or other community. It was understood as a possession, of relatively small scale, rather than as an 
object of political rule. It is only in the mid-fourteenth century, with the rediscovery of Roman law in the 
Italian city-states, that the notion of territorium became explicitly tied to that of jurisdiction. The actions of 
an individual merchant, for instance, were bound by the laws of the place he was in, rather than by who he 
 2 
was. This was a crucial shift from the personality of law to the territoriality of law.
8
 This idea was of great 
benefit to the secular political theorists who were trying to articulate the scope of political rule in 
opposition to the universalising aspirations of the Pope. Ruling on his own involvement in internal French 
politics, Pope Innocent III in 1202 had declared that ―the king recognised no superior in temporal matters‖.9 
While Innocent was trying to stress that he still had supremacy in spiritual matters, he was outlining a 
model that the secular theorists would soon adopt. Jurists on behalf of the King then articulated his power 
in terms parallel with that of the Holy Roman Emperor—within his kingdom, the King had the same 
powers as the Emperor in his Empire.
10
 Fusing these two ideas together meant that the king was claiming a 
supremacy of temporal power within his kingdom—a spatial extent of power, a power which would later 
become theorised as sovereignty. The Emperor, the King or later the city-state held supremacy within their 
borders. Theirs was a geographically restricted power, but within those areas they held the ultimate control.  
 
As Agnew hints in ‗The Territorial Trap‘, this is still some way from a modern state system of clearly 
demarcated territories. The production of that system was worked out, both in the Europe where these ideas 
emerged and in divisions of the colonised world, over the next several centuries. While the idea that the 
ruler had a monopoly of power within those boundaries became widely accepted, what those limits were 
was not yet fixed. Kingdoms, empires, and, later, states, could conquer land through war or acquire it 
through purchase, or be punished by its loss in punitive peace settlements. It was not until the early 
twentieth century that international conferences attempted to cement the territorial boundaries of states, 
beginning in Western Europe with the 1925 Locarno Treaties, and then codified in the United Nations 
Charter.
11
 Thus the international legal notion of territorial integrity brings together two distinct ideas—
territorial sovereignty and territorial preservation. These terms have separate histories and their fusion was 
an attempt to create a stability in the post-World War II world. Today, with notions of humanitarian 
intervention and contingent sovereignty, they are being separated again. Boundaries may remain fixed, and 
considerable efforts may be undertaken to preserve existing territorial settlements—witness the efforts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan to prevent their breakup—yet the sovereignty within them is held to be dependent on 
following particular codes of behaviour.
12
 If the latter explains the beginning of the wars launched by the 
USA and its allies; the former partially accounts for their continued presence in those states. 
 
This kind of historical approach, of which these overview points merely hint at the complexity, would seem 
another way to approach the challenges Agnew laid down fifteen years ago. Territory, both as a concept 
and as a political reality, requires much more work and analysis if we are to understand its contemporary 
limits and its historical and geographical conditions of possibility and specificity. Territory needs to be seen 
in relation to, but also in distinction from, two other terms, which themselves deserve careful analysis: land 
and terrain.
13
 Territory as a political question is not simply political-economic or political-strategic, but 
relates to developments in the law and the history of techniques such as land-surveying and cartography. 
Territory is, to borrow Foucault‘s term, a political technology. Territory also needs to be seen in relation to 
the category of ‗space‘, the history of which is now, post-Lefebvre, widely accepted. Territory is, clearly, 
not the only form of state space, much less political space. But it remains an important one. It is precisely 
because territory is a limited, historically specific, and non-exclusive way of spatial ordering, that it needs 
to be interrogated more thoroughly. All too often, and clearly contrary to Agnew‘s intent, the territorial trap 
has been avoided by being ignored, not by being critically interrogated. Rather we should ask how 
particular territorial settlements are produced, and how states operate in ways that normalise and perpetuate 
this spatial order of things. And, more generally, why have we become inured to this sense of territory as 
something politically fixed and conceptually static? This kind of historical conceptual examination of the 
state of territory might enable us to move beyond ‗the territorial trap‘ rather than simply avoid it, because it 
may help us to see how that trap was produced. 
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